tale of two kashmirs

source:gurumurthy.net
That China too has its Kashmir and problems with Islamist separatists identical to India’s Kashmir is not widely known. ‘Xinjiang’, actually pronounced as ‘Sinkiang’ for postal purposes, is China’s Kashmir. Xinjiang actually shares borders with Ladakh in India’s Kashmir. But unlike Kashmir it is not a small area. Its size is 1.8 million sq km; almost one-sixth of China; half as much as India. India’s Kashmir measures some 2,65,000 sq km. Of which some 86,000 sq km is under Pakistan; some 37,500 sq km under China; the balance, 1,41,000 sq km, is with India. The disputed part of India’s Kashmir, some 1,45,000 sq km, is less than one hundredth of Xinjiang. So China’s Kashmir is physically 100 times bigger than India’s and therefore its problem too is bigger. Yet many do not know about it.

The reason is that China prevented Xinjiang, its Kashmir, from becoming an international issue like India’s Kashmir. Xinjiang, which had a majority of Turkish Muslims (Uighurs) in 1949, had a short-lived state of East Turkestan. China invaded it, crushed it, and won back its territory. The name Xinjiang literally means ‘old frontier returns to China’. See the contrast. A year earlier, in 1948, India almost won back most of Kashmir from Pakistan which had invaded it, but voluntarily offered and turned it into an international issue. It was India, not Pakistan, which went to the United Nations; made it an international issue. It is struggling to say it is a bilateral one. Now, on to how China handled Xinjiang, its Kashmir, and integrated it with mainland China.

Xinjiang has a population of 20 million plus. The Uighur Muslims constitute 45 per cent, other Muslims 12 per cent and the Han Chinese 41 per cent. What was the Han population in Xinjiang in 1949? Just six per cent. In six decades it has risen by seven times. This change did not occur by itself. China did not just trust army or administrative control of its territory in Xinjiang. It trusted only its people. It ensured that the Han Chinese slowly began populating Xinjiang. The result is self-evident. But the 41 per cent Han Chinese population does not include defence personnel and families, and unregistered migrant Chinese workers.

Xinjiang was once known for a variety of agricultural products, but now, for more. Its GDP rose from $28 billion in 2004 to $60 billion in 2008. Its per capita GDP (2008) is $2,864, almost the same as the national average. It has large deposits of minerals and oil. The oil and gas extraction industry in Xinjiang is booming; it has a pipeline to Shanghai. This sector accounts for 60 per cent of Xinjiang’s economy. With a vast area, huge resources, and sparse population, Xinjiang benefits China more than the other way round. In contrast the economic cost of India’s Kashmir is very high. It receives a per capita Central grant of Rs 8,092, while for other Indian states it is Rs 1,137. If the grant were given directly by money order each Kashmir family of five would receive Rs 40,460 every year.

Still, the Uighur Muslims are unhappy with communist China. The World Uyghur Congress led by Rebiya Kadeer, a businesswoman based in Germany, is fighting for the freedom of Uighurs. There is violence and terror in Xinjiang like in Kashmir but not on that scale thanks to Pakistan’s ISI being friendly to China as common cause against India. The Uighurs are therefore not getting any support from Pakistan. Yet militancy is growing. There were terror strikes in Xinjiang on August 5 last year, just three days ahead of the Beijing Olympics, killing 16 policemen. On August 11, when the Olympics was in progress, attacks took place near Beijing in which 11 people were killed. And just last week, on July 6, there were huge riots between Uighur Muslims and Han Chinese in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, resulting in 184 deaths and over 1,000 people injured. Most of the dead and injured were Han Chinese even though Urumqi is overwhelmingly Han Chinese, nearly three-fourths. See how the Chinese reacted to the July 6 riots.

President Hu Jintao, who was to attend the G8 meeting, flew back in a tacit admission of the depth of the crisis. His government declared war on ‘three forces’, namely — ‘separatism, extremism and terrorism’. It banned Friday prayers in Urumqi mosques and told the Muslims to pray from their homes, something no other country would or could do. China has also pointed to al-Qaeda as inspiration for the trouble.

Yes, China does have problems with Islamist separatists, extremists and terrorists. But it has, by diplomacy and action, ensured that it remains an internal problem, unlike India, which has on its own made Kashmir an international issue. China has also changed the religious and political demography of Xinjiang by ensuring that 41 per cent of the province’s population is non-Muslim.

Instead of working to change the demography in favour of India as China has done, the Indian government could not even prevent the expulsion of Hindus from the Valley. While Xinjiang is half filled by Han Chinese, Kashmir has been cleansed of Hindus. The result is that India has to defend Kashmir with the army instead of the people.

Had India followed the policy the Chinese adopted in Xinjiang, conquering Kashmir back instead of contracting under Article 370, which prevents Indians in other places from migrating to the Valley, today Kashmir would have demographically integrated with India. We would be dealing with internal riots occasionally like China does; but we would not face or fight wars with Pakistan and with terrorists every day.

The lesson for India is: demography — religious demographic balance that is in tune with the national mainstream — is the guarantee for the nation, more so at the borders. China gradually brought Xinjiang, its Kashmir, into the national mainstream through the Han Chinese. But India constitutionally contracted to keep its Kashmir out of the mainstream; it even cleansed it of the mainstream by making the Hindus refugees in their own nation. What a contrast!

QED: Augustus Comte, the 19th century French philosopher, said, “demography is destiny”. Citing him, The Economist (August 24-31, 2002) emphasised the importance of demographic influences on nations and economies. China understood the critical nature of religious demography; India did not. This is the differing tale of two Kashmirs.

Homosexuality is not a virtue
by gurumurthy source-gurumurthy.net

Homosexuals displaced the Economic Survey for the year 2008-09 from the headlines of most media on July 3, 2009. “Historic bench mark”; “Sexual equality”; “Landmark Judgement”. This is how the media had headlined the Delhi High Court judgment holding Sec 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which makes homosexual acts offences in law, partly unconstitutional. Sec 377 of the Indian Penal Code was not Manu's code. It was Macaulay’s. This colonial law made homo sexuality punishable. In Judo-Christian tradition, homosexuality was seen an act against the law of God, punishable even with death. The Islamic rules also prescribed capital punishment for the offence. In all Abrahamic traditions, the hostility to homosexuality originated in the story associated with a city as Sodom (the etymological source of the world ‘sodomy’) where the sexual sin was first committed according to their texts, though the respective accounts varied. This is the philosophy of the law against homosexuals in Abrahamic societies. Macaulay’s law reflected their theological position. Earlier, there was no state law in India to punish homosexuality. Does that mean that the Hindu — read Indian — tradition approved of homosexuality? Read on.

What was the position of the state and state enacted laws in India such matters? The king or the state in India had refrained from handling most issues which the society or families could handle. It is the colonial state, with its laws and courts, that began to intrude the sovereign domain of the family and society. The Indian discipline was always built around unenforced social and family norms; not state laws. Self-restraint and shyness were the tools to regulate the deviants from the norms, not the police or courts. Even today, it is this non-formal moral order — read dharma — not the laws of parliament or state assemblies, that largely governs this society. India is otherwise ungovernable; just some 12000 plus police stations in some 7 lakh towns and villages cannot regulate over 110 crore people. Thanks to this moral order, the Indian society had handled, and even now handles, such sensitive issues with great finesse than does state law. It is in stark contrast to the gross state law and media discourse of today. Historian Devdutt Pattanaik says that in Hindu literature ‘though not part of the mainstream, the existence of homosexuality was recognised, but, not approved’. Narada smiriti prohibited marriage of homo sexual men with women. Manu did suggest mild punishments for homos, but of an extreme type. The Indian tradition therefore neither encouraged nor punished lesbians or gays; nor did it celebrate them or despise them. It regarded them as a small, marginal fact of life, preferring to ignore them; and treating them as not worthy of public discussion for or against that might disturb the rest of the society.

Homosexuals are, in numbers, marginal even in the West. In the US where the gay-lesbians are aggressive in the public discourse, the 2000 US Census data reveals that only 0.42% households are same-sex households. Studies in US or France and Canada show just some 1-2% admit to be gays or lesbians. The deviation from the mainstream behaviour is as marginal as that. Yet it is the geo-Christian hostility to even such marginal groups that turns them into vociferous action groups in the West.

In the Indian — read Hindu — civilisational ethos, humans had never been seen as belonging to one uniform behavioural class. The Indian civilisation had recognised diversity in behaviour and morals. It therefore never imposed one moral value or rule for all. But it believed in a hierarchy of moral principles. It held out right conduct as ideal for the rest to imbibe and follow, but on their own volition. Even as it had evolved normative moral principles for the mainline society, it had subtly ignored, rather than focus on or punish, the deviants. Those who could not follow an ideal were never held as illustration for others to follow.

For example, the Indian society had evo lved one man-one wife as the ideal model for life, but never made it the law. It had indeed celebrated monogamy; but had never prohibited or punished polygamy. It did not even outlaw polyandry. Even today, regardless of the law, polygamy prevails in different parts of India. Even polyandry exists in certain communities in North India. It is neither proscribed nor accepted by others. But even those who did not follow the ideal of monogamy never disputed its virtue; nor did those who followed that virtue look down upon those who did not. Sri Rama was monogamous, but his father, Dasharatha, was polygamous. Yet, Rama revered him; obeyed him totally. Rama is therefore rega rded, besides an ideal being, an ideal son as well. But Prahlada defied his father; he is regarded as an ideal person, though some may not see him as an ideal son like Rama. Likewise, Sita obeyed her husband; but Meera defied hers; and yet both are accepted as great. Obeying one’s husband or one’s father or being monogamous was held as a high virtue. Even the more macro idea of “ahimsa paramo dharma”, namely non- violence as “the highest value”, was regar ded as a virtue of those only who had renounced the world; and not for householders and others. So the society was ruled more by hierarchy of virtues and illustrative conduct than by law. What is correct was never judged by how many people adhered to it; but how virtuous it was and regarded by all as such.

Tolerance for the deviants from generally accepted human conduct is part of the Ind ian ethos. Here, the society would wisely ignore the marginal deviants rather than punish them, even discuss them — a more subtle, sensible social management principle. The society felt, even now feels, shy to discuss them. That is why the traditional religious scholars have refused to be drawn into the current debate on the issue. In the Indian tradition, homosexuals, as elsewhere, were thus regarded as deviants. But, here, unlike in the Abrahamic, the right of these deviants to exist without being punished was never denied; and will never be. Yet no one can argue here or elsewhere that homosexuality is a virtue. No law or court of law can declare it as a virtue. That is the crux of the debate; and that is what is being obfuscated.

QED: The Delhi High Court ruling held only one part of Sec 377 as unconstitutional. But what part is held constitutional — that is, what act of homosexuality is still punishable — cannot be described without allowing the discourse to become shameless; without spilling filth in the discourse. So it is not being described as shamelessness should yield to shyness. But, the media, particularly the visual, has been purveying needless filth using the issue for quite some time now. And growing shamelessness is replacing dignified shyness that marks the public discourse. Is it fair to subject a shy society to a shameless debate?